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The make-or-buy decision is analyzed in a three-layer principal-management-agent model.
There is a cost-saving/quality tradeoﬀ in eﬀort provision. The principal chooses between
employing an in-house management and contracting with an independent management; the
cost-saving incentives facing the management are, endogenously, weaker in the former case.
Cost-saving incentives trickle down to the agent, aﬀecting the cost-saving/quality trade-oﬀ.
It is shown that weak cost-saving incentives to the management promote quality provision
by the agent, and that a more severe quality-control problem between the principal and the
management, as well as a higher valuation of quality, make an in-house management more
attractive.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The make-or-buy decision has intrigued economists for generations. In somewhat diﬀerent dis-
guises it has been scrutinized by a large number of scholars.1 The diﬀerent disguises stem from
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1Important examples include: Coase (1937), Williamson (1985), Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore
(1990), Holmström and Milgrom (1994), Holmström (1999) and Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
1diﬀerent questions being asked. Some work focuses on the fundamental — but probably somewhat
quaint to non-economists — question about the nature of the ﬁrm and the forces determining
its boundaries; other work is more focused on hands-on trade-oﬀs concerning vertical integra-
tion. While this paper falls in the second category by focusing on the choice between in-house
production and outsourcing of activities, the most prominent distinguishing feature is the focus
on measurement-related determinants of this choice in an (almost) comprehensive-contracting
context. In addition, the choice between public and privatized management of “public-sector
activities” is an important source of motivation and application of the model presented.
Valuable insights about the make-or-buy decision have been gained within the property-
rights approach. The main insight is that in the presence of contractual incompleteness, activi-
ties involving two parties for which speciﬁc assets are important are more likely to be integrated
by one of the parties; the reason is that the owner of the speciﬁc asset may be subject to “hold-
up” by the other party.2 The hold-up problem, in turn, undermines incentives to invest in
speciﬁc assets.3
While the property-rights approach is conceptually convincing, it is clearly only part of the
story. An additional set of properties that are relevant is the measurement and contractibility
characteristics of the activity subject to the make-or-buy decision. There is, moreover, empir-
ical work indicating that measurement aspects are important for explaining the make-or-buy
decision: In their work on in-house versus independent sales forces, Anderson and Schmittlein
(1984) and Anderson (1985) found measurement-related explanatory variables to stand out most
strongly. Holmström and Milgrom (1991 and 1994) and Holmström (1999) have brought these
observations to bear in theoretical analyses of the make-or-buy decision.4
In this paper, we employ the measurement approach in trying to answer a number of speciﬁc
questions relevant when the make-or-buy decision is encountered in practice. More speciﬁcally,
we consider a three-layer hierarchy with a principal, a management, and an agent. The principal
— which may be, for example, the top executives of a ﬁrm or an elected body — delegates a task
2A party is subject to hold-up if another party threatens to withdraw from trade — in which case the speciﬁc
asset would be ineﬃciently utilized — in order to appropriate all, or a large portion, of the surplus.
3The seminal contributions are Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990); see Hart (1995) and
Holmström (1999) for clear and simple accounts of the basic logic.
4In Holmström and Milgrom (1991) it is argued that strong monetary incentives and rules governing how a
task is accomplished are substitutes in structuring appropriate over-all incentives. In Holmström and Milgrom
(1994), the complementarities among a set of instruments for aﬀecting performance in a given task, and the
implications of such complementarities for empirical work, are analyzed. Holmström (1999) explores how the
p o w e rt os t r u c t u r ei n c e n t i v e s—ak e yt r a i to ft h eﬁrm — may or may not be determined by asset ownership.
2to a management — which may be the middle management of a ﬁrm, or a subcontractor; the
management, in turn, delegates the actual execution of the task to an agent. The success in the
undertaking of the task has a cost-saving and a quality dimension, and the agent can allocate
his eﬀort between these dimensions.
The distinction between “make” and “buy” emanates from an agency problem in the rela-
tionship between the principal and the management; in the presence of this agency problem it
matters whether cost savings accrue to the principal or directly to the management. The accrual
of cost savings is the assumed underlying diﬀerence between make and buy, and this distinction
derives from cost savings being tied to an asset whose disposition is subject to incomplete-
contracting limitations. The management is assumed to exert some control over the cost-saving
measure, and this distorts cost-saving incentives if cost savings accrue to the principal, but not
if cost savings accrue directly to the management. In this framework, the principal provides
weaker direct cost-saving incentives when interacting with an in-house management. While we
devote parts of Section 2 to justifying the distinction between make and buy along these lines,
the intended main contribution is the analysis of the make-or-buy decision given this distinc-
tion. The core of the analysis deals with how equilibrium contracts and the equilibrium choice
between make and buy depend on the incentive problem faced by the management in rewarding
the agent, and by the principal in rewarding the management; in particular, the possibilities for
rewarding quality. The main results are that:
• the strength of incentives is subject to trickling down: when the management faces weak
incentives, the incentives provided to the agent by the management will be weak as well;
• there is trickling down in eﬀort allocation too: weakening cost-saving incentives for the
management will, under plausible circumstances, lead to more care being devoted to
quality “on the ground”;
• the more severe the incentive problem between the principal and the management as
regards quality measurement, the more likely is the principal to opt for an in-house man-
agement;
• the higher the value attributed to quality by the principal, the more likely is the principal
to opt for an in-house management.
While several of these results are quite intuitive, they are, arguably, generated in an empir-
ically plausible vertical structure which, importantly, accounts for the “make” and “buy” cases
3in a symmetric way.5 Moreover, the results have empirical implications that square well with
trade-oﬀs manifest in the context of outsourcing of government activities (see Section 5).
The related work by Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2004) builds on the core idea that market
incentives sometimes induce too much “signaling eﬀort,” i.e. eﬀort to inﬂate others’ assessment
of performance without promoting performance per se; they mention schooling and delegated
asset management as examples where this may be a signiﬁcant problem. Their analysis is
devoted to analyzing why incentives are, in general, weaker in ﬁrms and, even more so, in
governments, than in markets. They consider a career-concerns model with a “good” and a
“bad” component of eﬀort; after showing that market incentives may be excessively strong, they
argue that ﬁrms can remedy this by creating, by design, a moral-hazard-in-teams problem; they
also argue that competition between ﬁrms allows remnants of market incentives to trickle down
to employees, and that this eﬀect can be avoided by governments. Their paper is thus related
to this one in terms of the distinguishing characteristic of ﬁrms and governments compared to
markets; while they focus on the foundation for this diﬀerence, our focus is on the implications
for associating activities with modes of organization. Moreover, they work in a “contract-
free” environment, and hence do not address questions about the properties of actual incentive
contracts.
A related issue that has received some attention is the question how competition aﬀects
optimal managerial incentives.6 Levin and Tadelis (2005) also study the make-or-buy decision
by devising a simple theoretical model — driven by contract-administration costs — for generating
and testing prediction from contracting by US cities.7 There are also a number of papers that
employ principal-agent models with multiple-level hierarchies, most of them, however, focusing
on collusion between the agent and the next level in the hierarchy in concealing information
from the principal; Tirole (1986) is a seminal contribution.8
5A common criticism of the Williamsonian speciﬁc-asset story is the lack of a clear account for how and why
the hold-up problem is attenuated under vertical integration.
6Schmidt (1997) demonstrates the existence of two countervailing eﬀects, providing reasonable conditions for
competition to strengthen managerial incentives; Raith (2003) demonstrates that a positive correlation between
competition and incentives is likely to arise in cross-section data when there is underlying heterogeneity in terms
of product substitutability; Cue nat and Guadalupe (2003) provide empirical evidence of such a positive correlation.
7Another instance of related work is Tadelis (2002), who draws on work by Bajari and Tadelis (2001) on
ﬁxed-price versus cost-plus contracting in procurement to argue that the complexity of an activity makes “make”
a more likely outcome of the make-or-buy decision.
8Novaes and Zingales (2004) develop a model with a three-level hierarchy to explore whether the degree of
“bureaucratization” — in the sense of the amount of eﬀort devoted to creating input-based performance measures
4An important part of the motivation for this paper is the relevance of the analysis for the
organization of public-sector activities, public-sector activities referring to activities that are
publicly ﬁnanced or subject to extensive regulation and often provided directly by the public
sector.9 The most important contribution in this literature is Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997)
who employ an incomplete-contract framework in approaching the question of privatization
in general, and the issue of privatizing prisons in particular. In their model, the agent in
charge of the operation, the warden, makes two investments, one geared towards cost savings,
having adverse consequences for quality, and one geared towards quality-enhancing innovations.
While an in-house warden needs the consent of the principal to implement any investment, an
independent warden needs consent only for quality-enhancing innovations; in both cases, consent
is followed by renegotiation of the incomplete contract. It is shown that an independent warden
has excessive incentives for cost savings, and too weak incentives for quality innovations; an in-
house warden has too weak incentives for cost savings as well as quality innovations. The Hart-
Shleifer-Vishny model is clearly rife with insight concerning public-sector contracting in contexts
plagued by contractual incompleteness; it also endogenously obtains two distinct regimes — in-
house versus independent operations. The drawback of their approach is that the incentives
generated directly by contracts cannot be analyzed since contracts serve mainly as threat points
in renegotiation in their framework. Also, the implications for outsourcing within the private
sector are not addressed, possibly reﬂecting the view (shared by us) that the plausibility of the
assumptions rely on rigidities in terms of e.g. the duration of relationships that are typical for
the public sector.10 By focusing on the direct implications of contracts, we consider our work
complementary to theirs.11
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, a simple example highlighting the
trickling-down eﬀect is analyzed in order to provide some groundwork for the rest of the analysis;
in addition, the underpinnings of muted incentives for an in-house management are presented.
—o faﬁrm is optimal. Qian (1994) develops a model where the number of hierarchical levels is endogenous.
9See Domberger and Jensen (1997) for an overview of the issues and a review of some empirical evidence.
10In particular, it is clear that implicit contracts play a role in within-private-sector outsourcing relationships
that is inappropriate in relationships involving the public sector due to e.g. susceptability to corruption.
11One distinguishing feature of the public sector is arguably the feature that agencies and agents in one way
or another serve multiple principals or multiple goals (Dixit, 2002). Following Wilson (1989) there has been
some work on the desirability of creating clear “missions” — essentially undoing multiple-principal problems — for
public-sector bodies; Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999) provide formal support for this idea in a multi-task
career-concerns model. Somewhat relatedly, it may be argued that the intrinsic motivation of agents is more
important in the presence of weaker monetary incentives; this idea is explored by Besley and Ghatak (2005).
5Next, in Section 3 the two-task agency problem faced by the management is presented; in
Section 4 the main results are derived in the full three-layer model, and in Section 5 we discuss
applications and elaborations. In Section 6 we conclude the paper. Most of the analysis of the
full model is provided in the Appendix.
2B a s i c f r a m e w o r k
We will consider a three-layer agency model with a principal at one end. The principal has an
exogenously given task that she cannot solve by herself; she may be thought of as an elected
body or the top management of a ﬁrm or corporation. At the other end is an agent,w h oi nt h e
end solves the task; the agent may be thought of as a worker.
The principal cannot delegate the task directly to the agent. There could be several plausible
reasons for this. Our assumption is that the intermediate tier in the model, referred to as the
management, specializes in extracting good performance measures (he may apply this compe-
tence to several independent agents); this implies that any side contract between the principal
and the agent would suﬀer from — and in the extreme be undermined by — manipulation by
the agent. The management may be thought of as the middle management within a ﬁrm if the
task in question is solved in-house, and as the manager-owner of a subcontractor if the task is
outsourced.
The preferences of the parties are simple; they will be enriched in the full model below.
• The principal, P, is a risk neutral proﬁt maximizer, valuing the successful completion
o ft h et a s ki nq u e s t i o na ts o m eB>0. Assuming that the task is worthwhile solving,
the principal’s key objective is to minimize cost, and, in the following sections, ascertain
quality.
• The agent, A, cares about income, y,a n dt h ee ﬀo r th ee x e r t s ,a.H ei sr i s k a v e r s e ,a n d








with rA > 0 the agents level of absolute risk aversion; the speciﬁc utility function is
assumed in order for the full model to be reasonably tractable. The agent has reservation
payoﬀ uA.
• The management, M,i sr i s ka v e r s eo rr i s kn e u t r a la n dp r o ﬁt maximizing with preferences
6over net remuneration R given by
uM(R)=−exp{−rMR},
with absolute risk aversion rM ≥ 0. The management has a reservation payoﬀ uM.
To clarify the potential role of the management’s risk aversion we allow it in the introductory
example, abstracting from it in the full model for the sake of tractability. The nature of the task
will be quite general. In this section we will consider an example where the task is perfectly
contractible in all respects but one, which may be thought of as realized cost; in the sequel there
w i l l ,i na d d i t i o n ,b eaq u a l i t yd imension. Contracts are assumed to be linear in the relevant
performance measures; this is not important in the example in this section, but necessary to
have a workable multitask model below.12
In-house versus independent management. The presumption that incentives “originat-
ing in” an organization are, in general, weaker than incentives generated in contractual relations
between organizations is clearly crucial for the rest of the paper.13 We will refer to the two
c a s e sa st w oregimes. The distinction between the regimes arises from the combination of the
assumption about the accrual of cost savings below, and the agency problem introduced in
subsection 2.2; in the absence of any substantive agency problem between the principal and the
management, the diﬀerence between the two regimes would vanish.
Cost savings accrue through an asset that is, at least for practical purposes, indivisible and
whose value cannot be subject to a sharing contract. The assumptions about the asset are thus
in line with the property-rights approach although it plays the sole role of carrying the beneﬁts
of cost savings.14 An in-house management is deﬁned by the principal owning the asset; the
results of cost-saving eﬀorts thus accrue to the principal, whose payoﬀ is
B + x − Rin-house(x), (1)
where x is (unbiasedly) measured cost savings and where Rin-house(x) is the remuneration to the
management. An independent management, on the other hand, owns the asset and the results
of cost-saving eﬀorts accrue directly to the management; the principal’s payoﬀ is then
B − Rindep(x) (2)
12The most convincing rationale for linear contracts is provided by Holmström and Milgrom (1987).
13As we have noted, this is a widely shared presumption, articulated e.g. by Williamson (1998).
14The property-rights approach is presented by e.g. (Hart, 1995); while Hart dismisses unreﬂected reliance on
“residual income” in modeling, he also stresses the point that residual income in most cases and for good reasons
goes together with the residual control rights that come with ownership.
7where Rindep(x) is the contracted remuneration to the management; the management’s revenues
in this case are Rindep(x)+x.
2.1 Example
Consider now a case where the agent, in the end, exerts eﬀort, a, on a task whose outcome —
an inverse measure of realized cost — is, for simplicity, a. The contract governing the agent’s
reward, however, can be based only on a noisy performance measure
x = a + ε,
where ε is a random variable reﬂecting the fact that the outcome is aﬀected but not determined
by the agent’s eﬀort; ε is normally distributed with mean zero and variance v.15
The principal delegates the task to the management, oﬀering a linear contract
R = α + βx,
for constants α and β. If the management is risk neutral, it would seem natural to impose that
β =1 ; as we will discuss shortly, however, this is qualiﬁed due to the agency problem below.
The management, in turn, delegates the task to the agent, and the agent’s monetary reward
is
y = F + mx
for constants F and m.
Optimal contracts. Given the assumption that contracts are linear, the contract that the
management optimally oﬀers to the agent is simple. Since the analysis is a simpliﬁed roadmap
to the analysis of the multitask model below, which is deferred to the Appendix, we provide the
details.
The management solves (where expectations are w.r.t. the distribution of ε)16
max
m,F











F + ma − a2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª
≥ uA,






F + ma − a2/2 − rAm2v/2
¢ª¢
.
15One may note that the results would be the same if the outcome of the task was random too, as long as its
expectation was a; for example, the outcome could be equal to x.
















and similarly for M.
8Maximization by the agent yields a∗ = m; inserting this and taking logarithms we get
max α − F +( β − m)m − rM (β − m)
2 v/2 (3)
s.t. F + m2 − m2/2 − rAm2v/2 ≥−ln(−uA)/rA.
Solving the constraint — which obviously must bind — for F, we get the simple unconstrained
problem of maximizing
α +( β − m)m − rM (β − m)
2 v/2+m2 − m2/2 − rAm2v/2+l n ( −uA)/rA,
and the ﬁrst-order condition implies directly that
m = β ·
1+rMv
1+( rA + rM)v
. (4)
Note that the management’s risk aversion strengthens the incentives for the agent. More impor-
tant, however, the weaker the incentives faced by the management, whose strength is measured
by β, the weaker are the incentives provided by the management to the agent; this property is
clearly true quite generally in principal-agent models with a risk-averse agent.17
This extremely simple example highlights a straightforward and natural property that is
rarely noted, viz. that incentives trickle down. For example, it provides a simple and, arguably,
quite plausible explanation of the frequently made observation that incentives are weaker in
non-proﬁt ﬁr m st h a ni nf o r - p r o ﬁts, an observation that is sometimes considered puzzling; we
will come back to this when we discuss applications.
2.2 Origins of muted incentives
We will start by a formal development and then go on to interpretations and intuition.
Manipulation by the management. Consider an environment as in the example where
the management observes x = a + ε as described, but where the management can distort the
signal observed by the principal by means of manipulation.18 To keep things straightforward
17One can, for example, easily verify an analogous result in a two-outcome continuous-action model — equi-
librium incentives and equilibrium eﬀort are increasing in the payoﬀ diﬀerence between the bad and the good
outcome for the principal (the argument is available from the author). This means that expanding the prin-
cipal’s set of instruments would not change the solution qualitatively. This is worth noting since the problem
looks superﬁcially similar to the double-marginalization problem in monopoly theory. While it is true that in
the example by-passing the management would be beneﬁcial, the main results below deal with cases where the
blunting of incentives is desirable, which it is not in the monopoly context.
18This approach is in line with Baker (1992); it is also employed by Holmström (1999).
9and simple, let the principal’s signal be given by
z = x + γρd = a + ε + γρd, ρ ∈ {in-house, indep} (5)
where d is the management’s manipulation or distortion, and γρ > 0 is a constant that may
in principle — and, indeed, in practice as we will come back to — depend on the regime; in this
section, however, such potential dependence is inconsequential and we drop the subscript. The
management suﬀers disutlity d2/2 (in monetary terms) from manipulation d.
In-house management. In the case of an in-house management, cost savings accrue to
the principal while the principal must reward the management based on the available measure
of cost savings; cf. (1). Since the distortion, d, does not enter the management’s constraints,
and since it is separable from the management’s other choice variables (m and F), its eﬀect on
the management’s problem is simply to add a beneﬁt, βγd,a n dac o s t ,−d2/2,t ot h eo b j e c t i v e
function which adds up to a beneﬁto fγ2β2/2 since d = βγ is optimal for M.
The principal’s problem, however, is aﬀected more substantially. Again, we present some
i n - t e x ta n a l y s i sa tt h i sp o i n ts i n c ei ti l l u m i n a t es the ensuing more cumbersome analysis in the
general case. The principal maximizes her payoﬀ subject to the standard constraints, viz. that
the management attains its reservation payoﬀ, and that the management behaves optimally.
Formally, the principal solves (using reduced forms in the constraint):
max
α,β





α +( β − m)a + γ2β2/2 − rM (β − m)
2 v/2 − F
´o
≥ uM,
and (m,F) chosen optimally by M.
Noting that m = β (1 + rMv)/(1 + (rA + rM)v) and solving the agent’s participation con-
straint for F as in (3) we have
max
α,β
B +( 1− β)m − γ2β2 − α
s.t. α +( β − m)m + γ2β2/2 − rM (β − m)
2 v/2 −
£
−ln(−uA)/rA + rAm2v/2 − m2/2
¤
≥−ln(−uM);
the objective function is, substituting the constraint and simplifying,
B + m − m2/2 − γ2β2/2 − rM (β − m)
2 v/2 − rAm2v/2+l n( −uA)/rA +l n ( −uM).
The ﬁrst-order condition w.r.t. β implies, using dm/dβ =( 1+rMv)/(1 + (rA + rM)v),a n d
expressing m in terms of β,
β =
(1 + rMv)(1+(rA + rM)v)




10note, in particular, that when the management is risk neutral, rM =0 ,
β =
1
γ2 (1 + rAv)+1
.
showing that β =1if γ =0 ,w h i l eβ<1 if γ>0; the expression in (6) generalizes this
dependence on γ, showing that whenever γ>0, incentives provided to an in-house management
are limited by manipulation.
Independent management. In the case of an independent management, cost savings
accrue to the management, and the reward to the management is by construction the cost
savings plus what is contracted in addition; cf. (2). This means that, with b β denoting the
incentive provided by the principal in addition to the cost savings themselves, the objective



















−b βz − α
´
















In order to facilitate interpretation, it is useful to note that the eﬀective incentive intensity is
β = b β +1in the case of an independent management; indeed, it is readily shown that
m =( b β +1 )·
1+rMv
1+rAv + rMv
in this case. Working through this in a way similar to the in-house case above, one obtains the
solution
b β =
−rAvrMv(1 + (rA + rM)v)




note that b β =0(and thus β =1 )f o rrM =0 , and note also that when rM > 0 the principal
provides insurance to the management to an extent that decreases with manipulability, γ.
Interpretations. In the framework presented, the principal provides incentives to the
management to control costs; a is realized cost savings measured by x,a n dz is a distorted
measure of cost savings. This is a natural speciﬁcation if, for example, a measures long-term
cost savings, while x and z are accounting measure of cost savings, z to some extent being
controlled by the management.
11The interpretation in the case of an in-house management, with cost savings accruing to the
principal, is simple and clear: with strong incentives for measured cost savings come incentives
for manipulation, and the greater the management’s manipulation possibilities, the weaker are
optimal incentives.
If revenues accrue to the management, on the other hand, manipulation has a bite only
in so far as the principal oﬀers additional incentives (positive or negative) on top of the cost
savings themselves, corresponding to β =1 ; quite obviously the principal ﬁnds it optimal not
to oﬀer any such additional incentives to a risk-neutral management. The key is of course that
the objective of the party controlling the performance measure is the true cost savings. For
interpretations, consider a subcontractor to a ﬁrm with a contract sharing cost savings; clearly,
the subcontractor has incentives to inﬂate cost estimates whenever there is cost sharing in the
sense that β<1; γ>0 amounts to this being possible.
Let us ﬁnally relate the implications of the current set-up to those of the property-rights
approach reviewed brieﬂy in the introduction. The “residual rights of control” coming with
ownership of assets play a role somewhat related to that of the accrual of cost savings here.
In both cases, this is in some sense a manifestation of control. Here this is disadvantageous
as far as we see now, although it will be advantageous for second-best reasons under certain
circumstances below; in the property-rights approach the costs and beneﬁts of control depend
on whether the incentives gained by one party are more or less valuable than those lost by the
other party.
3 A two-task management-agent model
In this section we will develop and brieﬂy outline a two-task “management-agent model” that
will serve as our basic framework for the remainder of the paper; for tractability, the management
will be assumed risk neutral (we will come back this in Section 5).19 The thrust of the model
— as well as of other multitask principal-agent models — is that the incentive problem has an
eﬀort allocation dimension in addition to the eﬀort extraction dimension that is the deﬁning
element of most principal-agent models. In our application below, we will distinguish between
a cost-saving dimension and a quality dimension.
In formal terms, the model produces two output measures, x1 and x2, that depend stochas-
tically on two eﬀort (input) dimensions, a1 (cost savings) and a2 (quality), controlled by the
19Obviously, it would normally be called a principal-agent model, but for the sake of consistency with the
development of the full model below we call the two layers management and agent.
12agent.20 The management cares about x1 and x2 but, again, this could be modiﬁed to include
randomness with no consequences for the results. We assume that
xi = ai + εi,i=1 ,2,
where εi is noise, assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance vi,a n d
assumed independent across i. Note that this formulation — combined with the cost-saving and
quality interpretations of the two dimensions that we adopt — gives us a cost-saving dimension
and a quality dimension of eﬀort as well as measured output.
The rest of the setting follows the two lower tiers of the example in the previous section
closely. The management, being a risk neutral proﬁt maximizer, oﬀers the agent a contract that
speciﬁes monetary compensation that is constrained to be linear in the performance measures:
y = F + m1x1 + m2x2.
The agent has preferences over monetary compensation and eﬀort, (a1,a 2),a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (letting rA = r for brevity)
u(y;a)=−exp{−r[y − c(a)]}, where c(a)=a2
1 +2 κa1a2 + a2
2;
the parameter κ measures the degree of substitutability between a1 and a2 in the agent’s
disutility-of-eﬀort function. The agent has reservation payoﬀ uA.
The management values the two dimensions of realized output at β1 and β2 per unit, and
the problem faced by the management is thus





F + m1(a1 + ε1)+m2(a2 + ε2) −
¡
a2








F + m1(a1 + ε1)+m2(a2 + ε2) −
¡
a2




The solution, which is derived in the Appendix, is
m1 =
2rv2(β1 − β2κ)+β1




2rv1 (β2 − β1κ)+β2
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
; (8)
F is determined residually. The key insight added by the eﬀort-allocation dimension is — un-
surprisingly but importantly — that there is, in general, an interdependence between the two
20The seminal contribution to the development of this framework is Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
13output dimensions in the sense that incentives provided for one component of the result af-
fect inputs and results in both dimensions. This interdependence is a bit unwieldy even as we
rule out stochastic dependence between the noise terms and assume that each output measure
depends only on one input. Nevertheless, some general — and for our purposes important —
properties can be demonstrated by considering some special cases. We will take the case when
a1 and a2 are substitutes in the agent’s utility function — i.e. when κ>0 —a st h em a i nc a s e
and only occasionally note results for the other case; the complements case (κ<0)g i v e st h e
eﬀort-extraction problem a “free-lunch ﬂavor” that seems unnatural in most applications.
• First, consider the case where a2 has no intrinsic value to the management so that β2 =0
(note that this case departs somewhat from our assumptions below). This gives
m1 =
β1 (2rv2 +1 )
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
; m2 =
−2rv1κβ1
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
,
and we see that as long as the two inputs, (a1,a 2), are substitutes, the agent is punished
for a high x2.
• Secondly, consider the case where the informativeness about eﬀort in one dimension of
output, say 2, grows small, i.e. when v2 →∞ .I nt h i sc a s e
m1 =
2r(β1 − β2κ)
4r2(1 − κ2)v1 +2 r
; m2 =0 ,
and we see that the incentives provided for x1 must be used to control both dimensions of
eﬀort; from the expression one sees e.g. that if the uninformative dimension is important
enough — more precisely if β1 <β 2κ — output in the remaining dimension is punished.
The last case is important because the main case below will be relatively closely related to
it. It also highlights the general point that there are important circumstances under which weak
incentives are desirable for “second-best reasons.”
4 Incentives in the three-layer two-task model
We will now consider the general principal-management-agent model where the technology of
the project delegated to the agent is that speciﬁed by the two-task model. The preferences of the
principal and the management are the same as in the example — P and M are both risk neutral
proﬁt maximizers, M having reservation payoﬀ uM —a n dA’s preferences and action possibilities
were speciﬁed in the previous section. As in subsection 2.2, M can manipulate the cost-saving
measure in such a way that the principal observes z1 = x1+γd1 = a1+γd1+ε1. In addition, we
14assume that the principal has a similar informational disadvantage concerning the observation
of the quality-related performance measure, x2: The management observes x2 = a2 + ε2,w h i l e
the principal observes
z2 = a2 + qd2 + ε2, (9)
where q is a non-negative constant which we assume to be the same across regimes, and d2 is a
distortion of the signal controlled by the management, carrying a cost d2
2/2.
As in the example, cost savings accrue to the principal when an in-house management is
employed but directly to an independent management. We do not assume any such distinction
concerning quality; since the management does not care about quality directly (as opposed to
money) there is no room for such a mechanism. When an in-house management is employed,
the principal’s objective is
V = B + a1 + pa2 − Rin-house(z),
where the quality-related performance may weigh more or less heavily in the principal’s payoﬀ
according to the parameter p ≥ 0,a n ds h eo ﬀers a linear contract to M:
Rin-house(z)=β0 + β1z1 + β2z2.
With an independent management, V = B+pa2−Rindep(z),w i t hRindep(z)=β0+a1+b β1z1+
β2z2.
Consider now the principal’s problem, which is stated and analyzed in the Appendix. For
the case of an in-house management, it is
max
β
B +( 1− β1)a1 +( p − β2)a2 − β2
1γ2 − β2
2q2 − β0 (10)
s.t. β0 +( β1 − m1(β))a1 +( β2 − m2(β))a2 + β2
1γ2/2+β2
2q2/2 − F(m1(β),m 2(β)) ≥ uM,
where are determined by the M’s optimization problem. The case with an independent man-
agement is similar except for β1 being replaced by b β1 = β1 − 1.
There are two important things to note about this way of formulating the principal’s prob-
lem: First, β1 and β2 vary freely as a function of γ and q (and p below); as we will elaborate
in the next subsection, this is a natural parameterization for comparative statics of the relative
desirability of an independent versus an in-house management. Secondly, when the quality
measure is manipulable (q>0) it is no longer true in general that β1 =1for an independent
and risk neutral management, but it is still true that β1 is unambiguously larger ceteris paribus
for an independent management; this is seen by noting that the terms in (10) involving β1a1
cancel if one substitutes the constraint (and that the objective function is concave in β as we
note below).
154.1 Comparative statics
Absent manipulability — i.e. for γ = q =0— the problem faced by the principal is simple: The
management delegates the project to the agent with equilibrium incentives according to (7) and
(8). The principal just forwards her incentives to the management, β1 =1and β2 = p.
In the presence of manipulability, on the other hand, incentives will depend on γ and q.
The comparative statics of β1 and β2 as manipulability of cost savings gains strength (γ grows)
are straightforward and unsurprising: ∂β1/∂γ < 0 and ∂β2/∂γ has the opposite sign to κ,
that is, when κ is positive, ∂β2/∂γ < 0. Consider next equilibrium eﬀort, (a1,a 2),a n di t s
dependence on the attenuation of cost-saving incentives. Equations (A.4) and (A.5) in the
Appendix show that while the dependence of equilibrium eﬀort on γ is in general ambiguous,
we have an unambiguous result when v2 is large — i.e. when the observation of the quality
dimension is a poor indicator of quality. In that case, a1 is unambiguously decreasing in γ,
while a2 is increasing in γ when κ>0 (and decreasing if κ<0). Formally:
Proposition 1 Cost-saving incentives, β1, are attenuated as manipulability of the cost-saving
measure (γ) grows. Incentives for quality provision, β2, are attenuated (strengthened) if κ>0
(κ<0). When quality measurement is suﬃciently imprecise (i.e. v2 is suﬃciently large),
equilibrium cost-saving eﬀort (a1)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nγ,a n de q u i l i b r i u me ﬀort exerted on quality
(a2)i si n c r e a s i n g( d e c r e a s i n g )i nγ for κ>0 (κ<0).
As an immediate corollary of the proposition, together with the fact that an independent
management provides stronger cost-saving incentives, it follows that opting for an independent
management rather than an in-house one makes the agent “on the ground” focus more on cost
savings at the expense of quality when there is “competition” between the two components of
eﬀort, i.e. when κ>0. By tilting incentives towards cost savings at the management level,
the activities on the ground are tilted in the same direction due to the trickling-down eﬀect.
From a positive perspective, the result thus seems to corroborate commonsensical notions of,
for examples, the consequences of outsourcing and privatization.
Considering comparative statics with respect to q,w eﬁnd that q aﬀects β2 negatively, while
the eﬀect on β1 has the opposite sign of κ, i.e., a harder quality-control problem as measured
by q leads to an attenuation of cost-saving incentives too when κ>0.
In the presence of manipulability, equilibrium incentives to the management depend non-
trivially on other variables, such as the valuation of quality, p, and the incentive problem faced
by the management (as measured by v1 and v2). The dependence on p is clear cut: The
incentive intensity for quality, β2, depends positively on p; i.e., a higher valuation of quality by
16the principal increases the optimal reward for quality to the management. More interestingly,
for q>0 — i.e. in the presence of manipulability of the quality measure — ∂β1/∂p has the
opposite sign of κ;i . e . ,w h e ne ﬀorts are substitutes a higher valuation of quality makes the
principal want to blunt cost-saving incentives. This is quite important since it conﬁrms that
there is a trickling-down eﬀect in the eﬀort-allocation dimension as well: In the presence of an
agency problem between P and M, blunting cost-saving incentives for the management helps
shifting the agent’s eﬀort towards the quality dimension; moreover, this blunting of cost-saving
incentives is an optimal response to a higher valuation of the quality of output.
4.2 The trade-oﬀs
The comparative statics of the optimal contract oﬀered by the principal to the management can
straightforwardly be translated into statements about how the optimal mode of governance —
i.e. make or buy — are aﬀected by manipulability, q, and the importance of quality, p.
The choice between make (employing an in-house management) and buy (contracting with
an independent management) is a choice between facing a cost of providing cost-saving incentives
due to manipulation by an in-house management, and a cost of muting cost-saving incentives
(relative to β1 =1 ) due to manipulation by an independent management. Since the objective
function is well-behaved in being concave (and, in fact, quadratic) in (β1,β2) —a si ss h o w n
in the Appendix — an exogenous shift leading to a reduction in β1 can be identiﬁed with a
shift that makes choosing an in-house management more attractive. The following proposition
follows directly from the analysis in the previous subsection.
Proposition 2 Suppose that cost-saving eﬀort and quality eﬀort are substitutes in the agent’s
utility function (κ>0). Then an in-house management is more attractive relative to contracting
with an independent management: (i) the more severe is the quality-control problem faced by
the principal in dealing with the management (i.e. the larger is q), and, for q>0, (ii) the more
valuable is quality for the principal (the higher is p).
While the proposition has clear qualitative implications for the choice of regime it may allow
an independent management with substantively muted cost-saving incentives for signiﬁcant
ranges of other parameters if γ is not too large. If, however, there is more room for manipulation
of measures of realized costs by an independent management (γindep >γ in-house) — as is arguably
quite reasonable — there is correspondingly less room for cost-sharing arrangements between the
principal and an independent management, and an in-house management will be optimal for a
larger range of parameters.
17I nt h ea n a l y s i sw eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tq is equal across the two regimes. While this may or
may not be reasonable, the results only depend on the much weaker property that manipulability
across activities varies similarly in the two regimes: As long as this is the case the notion of an
activity with a high degree of manipulability is well deﬁned, and the prediction that the higher
this degree, the more likely is the activity to be performed in-house, stands.
An additional question to ask would be how the optimal contract between the principal and
the management depends on the measurement problem, i.e. how (β1,β2) depends on v2.T h i s
question turns out not to have a clear answer however.
5 Applications and elaborations
In this section we will elaborate on the results and discuss robustness and extensions.
Robustness. In a way, the assumed information structure is simple. In particular, the
principal and the management observe performance measures of the agent’s activity that are
closely related to one another. Apart from being in the interest or tractability, however, it
seems hard to argue that there is likely to exist substantial asymmetries of a diﬀerent nature
that would be directly relevant to our inquiry. As to risk aversion, we have abstracted from
it in the analysis of the full model; looking at the examples in Section 2 it seems clear that it
would not alter our results substantially.
Empirical implications. There are two sets of empirical implications tied to Propositions
1 and 2 respectively. The main implication of the ﬁrst proposition — that in-house production
is a way of securing quality when quality measurement is imprecise — is, in our view, that there
is some truth to the often-heard argument that privatization or outsourcing may be a threat to
quality. This is interesting and important but does not lead much further since it does not tell
anything about optimal contracts.
The implications of Proposition 2 — that in-house production is more likely the more severe
the quality-control problem between the principal and the management, and the more important
is quality — on the other hand, produce empirically testable hypotheses about governance of ac-
tivities. To give a simple example, it would seem to predict that management-type activities and
research-and-development activities be organized in-house rather than independently. It also
provides a potential rationale for the pervasiveness of publicly provided elementary education,
18although this view is sometimes challenged as we will note below.21
Privatization and outsourcing. Although we believe that the framework developed can
prove useful in systematic empirical investigations of determinants of outsourcing and privatiza-
tion, this is not the place for explorations in such directions. Instead, we will conﬁne ourselves
to discussing a salient example. It is generally held that garbage collection is a prime example
of an activity, often performed in-house by local governments, that can be contracted out in a
way that leads to substantial cost savings without jeopardizing quality.22 Snow removal is an
activity that may superﬁcially look similar to garbage collection. There are, however, scattered
evidence from Sweden — in particular from a major overhaul of snow removal in the city of
Stockholm — indicating that contracting out is likely to work much less well in this case. There
are, we believe, two distinguishing features that may explain the diﬀerence: uncertainty and
measurement problems. While uncertainty clearly plays a role, the measurement issue is fun-
damental: In order to establish a contractually viable relationship between the eﬀort exerted in
snow removal and “snowfreeness,” an elaborate measurement apparatus is necessary. However
ambitious — and costly — such an apparatus is construed, it is still bound to rest heavily on
vague criteria. The upshot is that in-house provision — with the accompanying weak incentives
— is likely to be a substitute for some of the measurement eﬀort and, in the end, possibly prefer-
able.23 This example illustrates, in our view, two important points: ﬁrst, measurement is key;
secondly, whether or not an activity is suitable to outsourcing/contracting out has little to do
with its production technology and all to do with contracting possibilities.24
Firms, governments and non-proﬁts. In this paper, our focus is on the make-or-
buy decision concerning a particular activity, and how the decision is aﬀected by the nature
of the activity. The driving mechanism is the muted cost-saving incentives induced by in-
house production. A related question is whether the constraint that cost-saving incentives
21This example is pushed by Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2004) too.
22See e.g. Savas (1977).
23Note that the endogeneity of the imprecision of measurement alluded to takes us a little bit beyond the
model, but not in a consequential way.
24The last point is re-infored by noting that steps towards privatization in schooling in the sense of stu-
dent/parent choice combined with some extent of free entry seems to work well in many circumstances; see
e.g. Hoxby (2002). The reason seems to be that quality control can be decentralized to students/parents under
voucher-type competition. The model in this paper is not directly applicable to such an environment, but the
example illustrates the point that the production technlogy and the “softness”/“hardness” of the activity are not
the key determinants of its suitability to choice and private provision.
19in-house not be too strong may be diﬀerent for diﬀerent types of organizations. There is, for
example, reasons to believe that incentives in non-proﬁt organizations are weaker than in for-
proﬁt organizations.25 The diﬀerence between ﬁrms and governments in this regard is, moreover,
corroborated by Acemoglu, Kremer and Mian (2004). In terms of our model, γ might diﬀer
across types of organizations, and this would have relatively straightforward implications for
organizational choice. This may, for example, throw light on the prevalence of non-proﬁts in
some sectors, like hospitals and schools, and it may also rationalize calls for prohibiting for-
proﬁt actors in certain types of activities.26 In pursuing this line of thought, the trickle-down
property of incentives seems particularly pertinent.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
In this paper we have tried to approach the make-or-buy decision in a comprehensive-contracting
framework emphasizing the measurement aspects of cost savings and quality. We have shown
that incentives trickle down from the principal-management contract to the management-agent
contract, and that this produces the result that outsourcing, roughly, is less attractive, the
harder is the quality-control problem. Finally, we have discussed implications for outsourcing
and privatization.
There are a number of substantive questions raised but unanswered by this paper. First, the
current theory seems — as we have noted — readily extended to analyzing the choice among, for
example, for-proﬁt, non-proﬁt and government operation; this extension seems worthwhile, and
it may oﬀer tractable empirical implications as a side beneﬁt. Secondly, while our approach to
modeling the underlying reason for the distinction between make and buy is, in our own view,
convincing, this deserves further investigation. More generally, one would like to see further
integration between measurement-based and asset-ownership-based theories of make-or-buy.27
This model, or variants of it, seem potentially useful in such an undertaking.
25See Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) for an empirical explorations of hospitals, and Glaeser and Shleifer (2001)
for a simple theoretical model.
26T h i sa l l u d e st oar a t h e rﬁerce debate in Sweden about whether or not for-proﬁt hospitals should be prohibited.
27Holmström (1999) takes some preliminary steps.
20Appendix
Solving the management-agent model The problem can be written
max [(β1 − m1)a1 +( β2 − m2)a2 − F]
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2])) ≥ u0
and optimality for the agent, the ﬁrst-order conditions for which are
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2 +2 κ(m1 − κm2)(m2 − κm1)+( m2 − κm1)2] − e u.
Simplifying by multiplying by 2(1 − κ2),w eh a v e
β1 (m1 − κm2)+β2(m2 − κm1) − r(1 − κ2)m2








2 + κ(m1 − κm2)(m2 − κm1)+
1
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(m2 − κm1)2] − b e u.
The ﬁrst-order conditions w.r.t. (m1,m 2) are:
β1−β2κ−2r(1−κ2)v1m1−
1
1 − κ2 [(m1 − κm2)+κ[(m2 − κm1) − κ(m1 − κm2] − κ(m2 − κm1)] = 0,
β2−β1κ−2r(1−κ2)v2m2−
1
1 − κ2 [−κ(m1 − κm2)+κ[(m1 − κm2) − κ(m2 − κm1]+( m2 − κm1)] = 0;
or, simplifying,
β1 − β2κ =
µ







β2 − β1κ =
κ3 − κ
1 − κ2m1 +
µ





This can be written
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⎝ 2r(1 − κ2)v1 +1 −κ
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D =4 r2(1 − κ2)2v1v2 +2 r(1 − κ2)v1 +2 r(1 − κ2)v2 +1− κ2 =
(1 − κ2)
£
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
¤
;
note that it is positive. Solving, we obtain
m1 =
2rv2(β1 − β2κ)+β1




2rv1 (β2 − β1κ)+β2
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n s1a n d2 . The principal’s problem in the three-layer model.
The argument is made for an in-house management; the conclusions are the same — with
almost exactly the same argument — for the other case. The principal’s problem is, suppressing B
in the principal’s objective since it does not aﬀect solutions, and using the fact that manipulation
satisﬁes d∗




E [a1 + pa2 − (β0 + β1 (x1 + γd1)+β2 (x2 + qd2))] = (1 − β1)a1 − β2
1γ2 +( p − β2)a2 − β2
2q2 − β0
s.t. E(β0 +( β1 − m1)x1 +( β2 − m2)x2 + β2
1γ2/2+β2
2q2/2 − F) ≥ uM
and m maximizes E(β0 +( β1 − m1)x1 +( β2 − m2)x2 + β2
1γ2/2+β2
2q2/2 − F) s.t. M’s constraints
where uM is M’s reservation utility. Taking expectations, this can be written
max
β
(1 − β1)a1 +( p − β2)a2 − β2
1γ2 − β2
2q2 − β0
s.t. β0 +( β1 − m1(β))a1 +( β2 − m2(β))a2 + β2
1γ2/2+β2
2q2/2 − F(m1(β),m 2(β)) ≥ uM,
with m1 and m2 chosen optimally, and F determined by the participation constraint.
Substituting the constraint, the objective function (denoting it φ)i s
φ(β1,β2)=( 1− m1(β))a1 +( p − m2(β))a2 − β2
1γ2/2 − β2
2q2/2 − F(m) − uM









































Importantly, the objective is jointly concave in β. This follows from the fact that φ is concave
in m,w h i l e m is linear — and thus weakly concave with a zero second derivative — in β from
(7) and (8).
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− β2q2 =0 , (A.2)







is clearly a solution to the principal’s problem too, and with β1 =1and β2 = p the m’s solving
the system will coincide with equilibrium m’s. This conﬁrms the already-noted fact that setting
β1 =1and β2 = p is optimal for the principal in the absence of manipulation.
To say something about cases where there are distortions or constraints making a ﬁrst-best
contract (in this context, i.e. in the absence of further distortions) between P and M infeasible,
we need to develop (A.1) and (A.2) explicitly, however. To do this, we note
m1 =
2rv2(β1 − β2κ)+β1
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
; m2 =
2rv1 (β2 − β1κ)+β2
4r2(1 − κ2)v1v2 +2 rv1 +2 rv2 +1
;
for notational convenience, denote the denominator of these expressions:
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¡
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¢
+ γ2q2 e N2 > 0,
where e D is the determinant of the Hessian when e N is factored out and the terms −γ2 e N and
−q2 e N are ignored. Thanks to the concavity of φ, we know that e D is positive (and it is relatively




24Comparative statics with respect to γ.





























2rv1 + κ22rv2 +1
¢
+ q2 e N
o
−β1 {κ(2rv1 +2 rv2 +1 ) }
⎞
⎠;
clearly, ∂β1/∂γ2 < 0 (and hence, obviously, ∂β1/∂γ < 0)w h i l et h es i g no f∂β2/∂γ2 is opposite
that of κ.
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The main conclusion coming from this is that the ﬁrst term is leading for large enough v2,i . e .














and we ﬁnd that here, too, the ﬁrst term is leading for large enough v2, implying — expectedly
— that cost-saving eﬀort is reduced.
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The key observations to make are that the sign of ∂β1/∂q2 is opposite to the sign of κ,a n dt h a t
∂β2/∂q2 is unambiguously negative.
Comparative statics with respect to p. The analysis follows similar lines as those underlying
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Expectedly, ∂β2/∂p > 0; it is also worth noting that for q =0there is no eﬀect on β1.
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